One of the more interesting philosophical questions to ask a nontheist is “What evidence would it take for you to believe in God?”
Many nontheists can’t answer this question clearly, which I think is funny, because it’s not a hard question. To demonstrate, let’s rephrase the question and present it to a believer:
What evidence would it take for you to believe in a different God? Or no God at all?
Traditionally, nontheists will say something that sounds question-begging like “Any piece of good evidence.” Indeed, famous atheists such as Bertrand Russell and Richard Dawkins both said as much.
The problem with this answer is that there is evidence for God, by virtue of the many people who believe in God and formulate arguments in favor of God’s existence. Now, whether or not that evidence is good evidence is a different matter, but just pretending there isn’t some kind of evidence or reasoning that at least some people find compelling to believe in God isn’t a good response.
That’s not to say that the nontheist has no reason to doubt theistic arguments and evidence or that such evidence is necessarily compelling. Indeed, I’ve written in the past about how it’s hard to believe even awesome evidence for a position you disagree with, and that’s because of the way human psychology and idea formation works.
Rather, my point here is to say that nontheists need a better answer to this question, and on a general level, there are two easy answers to it:
Many facts about the world would have to be different.
Facts about myself would have to be different.
Once we explain each of these parts, it will raise a more interesting philosophical problem for certain theists, a trilemma I will call the PEG trilemma.
This trilemma says we cannot believe God is perfectly just, good, and powerful, affirm the realities of human psychology influencing belief formation, and the reality of eternal conscious torment.
Different Facts
The question of “what evidence would it take for you to (not) believe in (a different) God” is implicitly empirical in that it relies on matters of fact, not logical axioms. In some ways, this seems obvious or trivial. If I asked you what evidence it would take to change your mind about anything, you’d obviously answer with specific facts you believe being cast into severe doubt or changed altogether.
For instance, if I asked you what it would take for you to vote for a different political party than you normally do, you’d probably have a list of policies and issues you care about, how your preferred political party addresses those issues, and how the dispreferred political party contradicts them. To change your mind, you’d need the normally-dispreferred party to be more in line with your preferences, or at least not be as against them, while the normally-preferred party simultaneously becomes worse or ineffective at addressing the issues you care about.
Similarly, when we express changing our minds about nuanced and philosophical issues, we understand that it usually takes more than one piece of evidence or matter of fact to get the job done. What’s more, if someone is going to be cognizant of the specific criteria for them to change their mind, that criteria will probably be multifaceted and complex.
Another way of saying this is that we hold beliefs with strong conviction because we have abundant compelling reasons supporting those beliefs. And so, when someone asks another person what it would take to change their mind, the questioner should be prepared for a very long answer. We should be very suspicious of both theists and nontheists who dismiss their interlocutors for being dogmatic just because those interlocutors fail to succinctly express the evidence it would take for them to change their mind. The fact is (pun intended), most people don’t understand their own beliefs so thoroughly, and those that do will have a very long explanation for why they do or don’t believe something.
Still, the nontheist can present a succinct answer to this question that touches on the general point: “I’d change my mind if multiple facts about the world were substantially different.”1
I Would Have To Be Different
The second answer to the mind-changing question also points to facts, but instead of facts about the world we observe, they are facts about the person contemplating the facts.
Humans are different from rocks and toasters because they have the capacity to think (however that is defined). In possessing that capacity to think, facts about personal psychology and contingent circumstances influence how humans think. I believe things for different reasons when I am a child than when I am now as a (relatively) healthy adult or when I am a dying or sick adult in the future. The underlying circumstances that influence my psychology are different in each of those circumstances; that is, my brain states are different in each of those circumstances.
Though a child may one day grow into a healthy adult who eventually grows into a sick or dying adult, the aforementioned person is slightly different at these different stages of life. Though this person may be the same person by being in continuity with the same body, collection of cells, and so on, the beliefs of that person will be different at these different stages of life because of these varying circumstances and brain states.
In this way, you can psychologize anyone to find an explanation for why someone believes as they do, though it’s considered rude. We need not get into details about individual people or stereotypes of different philosophical groups,2 so much as we can point to two different people possessing the same intelligence, understanding of the facts, and so on, and also show those same two people having very different opinions about matters of religion, politics, and society.
All of this is to say that people will change their mind about these issues, even without being exposed to new information or facts about the world. If facts about someone’s personal psychology change (from being brain-injured, growing more mature, or experiencing different life circumstances), their opinion on various issues can potentially change as well.
People don’t like acknowledging this for various reasons. For one, it gives off deterministic vibes. We like to hold people morally accountable for their beliefs, especially when those beliefs influence actions. It doesn’t seem right to reward or punish people for beliefs that they didn’t form completely on their own accord.
What’s more, we have stereotypes and folk explanations about why people believe false things, and those stereotypes and beliefs strongly inform how we approach disagreement. Among these is the belief that we all have basically the same reasoning ability, and the only reason someone would disagree with us is if they are either not as smart as us, lack key pieces of information, or are otherwise evil.
Just monitor how two people disagree with each other outside of a civil academic or a podcast discussion setting. The interlocutors will constantly bring up new information to change the other person’s mind, and when that doesn’t work and the disagreement proves insoluble, the two sides will often insult the other side’s intelligence.3
But anyone who has had a debate at a family dinner knows that these beliefs about disagreements aren’t true. Instead, one’s prior beliefs, personal psychology, and other factors act as defensive walls against new facts and reasoning that run against those beliefs. Our personal psychology and individual methodologies for forming beliefs and evaluating facts will often determine the facts we accept or allow to influence our beliefs and reasoning.
I’ll admit that some of this may come off as elitist, as if I’m implying that I’m a smart person who doesn’t fall victim to prior beliefs and attitudes shielding me from inconvenient facts and reasoning. I harbor no such delusion! I know full well that my own beliefs and assumptions form a fortress against changing my mind.
I’d like to think what makes me different is not that my psychology is different, but because I don’t indulge the folk psychology and stereotypes. When someone radically disagrees with me, I don’t pretend that the disagreement is just about the facts or anything about their character, but largely due to differences in life circumstances, personality, and who we are as people, among many many other things.4
What’s more, I’ll also admit that this understanding of belief formation may come off as fatalistic, as if there’s no point in persuasion of disagreements. By no means is this my point! People (including myself) have the capacity to change their minds, even radically. It’s just that new information by itself is usually not good enough. As flawed as our psychology is, it converges on the truth of reality on the most consequential issues of our individual survival and happiness. Most people agree about facts about human nature, math, budgeting, hygiene, and so on.
That we disagree on a handful of contentious issues isn’t a testament to how different we are, but rather how alike we are.
The PEG Trilemma
I imagine some of my Christian readers read the section above, smiled, nodded, and thought “Yes, this is how sin works, sin leads us to resist the truth.” The problem with this is that Christians are just as resistant to inconvenient facts as everyone else, and to them, that resistance can actually be virtuous in that it prevents Christians from accepting anti-Christian arguments, safeguarding them from losing faith.
And so, I don’t think it’s fair to label these mental habits as sinful or synonymous with sin’s effect on humanity, so much as it’s a neutral aspect of human psychology. It makes sense that we’d evolve to be a little bit stubborn, at least when it comes to facts that are important enough for our enduring survival. That is, it would probably be more costly for us to be open to change our mind on anything than it would be if we were really stubborn about a few things. It would be really hard for us to survive and reproduce as humans if we were so skeptical and indefensive of important beliefs that we changed them at the first counterpoint.5
If this is true, then, and the relative stubbornness of humans on important issues is neutral or even good, this raises an important question for theists who believe in eternal conscious torment:
If the stakes of eternal salvation are so high, why did God make us this way?
That is, why should a human suffer eternally for forming false beliefs due to their psychology that they had no control over, when God Himself had some control over that psychology’s formation?
This is a problem of hiddenness and of evil or suffering. The hiddenness problem derives from God shaping human psychology to behave this way, increasing the likelihood that people would form false beliefs about Him that also leads them to not want to form a relationship with Him, or to otherwise be resistant to Him. The evil or suffering problem comes from the consequences of disbelief; not only did God design human psychology in this way, but He also created the conditions where disbelievers would suffer eternally as a result of that psychology.
And so we have a trilemma, which I call the PEG Trilemma. If you’re a theist you can believe two of:
The Reality of Human Psychology as I’ve described it in this post (P),
Those who disbelieve in God or fail to form a relationship with God will suffer eternal conscious torment (E),
God is all loving, all powerful, and perfectly just (G).
But you cannot affirm all three.
Indeed, G and E on their own is the problem of Hell. For the purposes of the trilemma, we can concede (for the sake of argument) that the problem of Hell is not a problem. My point in formulating the trilemma is that P increases the problem of Hell because it makes God complicit in the pain and suffering created by E, which contradicts His nature, found in G.
That is, you can postulate that God letting people go to Hell is Him respecting their free will, but it’s hard to believe that when God shaped their free will to put them in that situation. Tying this together with the “What Evidence” Question, God could have made the world or human psychology differently, to increase the probability that more people would avoid eternal conscious torment, but He didn’t.
Christians who affirm ECT will typically respond that humanity has this psychology either as a consequence of the fall of man in the Garden of Eden or as a result of their individual choices, but this doesn’t solve the problem. God, being all knowing, could have anticipated the consequences of His actions when creating the universe and humanity to avoid that outcome, but He didn’t.
This is a typical nontheistic counterargument, but what makes the PEG trilemma different from the problem of evil is that, instead of being passive or impotent, the P aspect of the trilemma makes God actively complicit in the eternal conscious torment of the creatures he created.
Conclusion
As a nontheist, I could see myself one day believing in God because my mental states will inevitably change, and so I don’t see anything intellectually costly about admitting the possibility of a future conversion, deathbed or otherwise. I also believe that if God is real, we can solve many problems of suffering and evil with postulations of ultimate redemption and healing through the afterlife.
Having said that, I don’t see myself affirming traditionalist Christianity that affirms ECT because ECT invalidates all of those postulations. What’s more, it just doesn’t make sense to say that God is perfectly just, all-loving, and powerful, and yet is complicit in the eternal conscious torment of those who don’t form a relationship with Him. Given that God had a direct or indirect hand in shaping human psychology, his complicity in Humans’ nonbelief is unavoidable.
The solution of this trilemma, like any, is simple: Deny at least one of the propositions! The easy solution is to jettison E. But, unfortunately, Christians and other theists instead deny P, oversimplifying the complexity of human psychology and morally shaming those who disbelieve as sufficiently culpable to deserve eternal conscious torment.
I wish they wouldn’t do this. I don’t really care if people believe in God or not, but I would urge them to deny ECT, as it makes their worldview more irrational at best and probably less virtuous at worst.
For me, the reality of human psychology appears more plausible than the reality of God (because we can directly observe and test human psychology), which appears more plausible than the reality of ECT. It’s curious to see people deny the most plausible and demonstrable thing instead of the least plausible thing.
In all, I’d advise theists to not assume nontheists are being stubborn or irrational. Nontheists would certainly change their mind if either the evidence they’ve observed or if their personal psychology were different. That the world is the way it is and that humans deny belief in God is not a problem for the nontheist, but is a major problem for a theism that affirms eternal conscious torment.
For this post, I’m not going to elaborate on what specific facts about the world would have to be different because that would be a long post in itself, and I think the forthcoming trilemma is more interesting to write about here.
Though that can be fun if done with an open mind, sense of humor, and spirit of charity.
I’m guilty of this on substack notes, but that’s mainly because people are obnoxious in trying to argue in notes when I’ve given no indication that I want to argue something. I don’t insult people for disagreeing with me because I think they’re stupid, but because I think they’re rude and have violated some decorum. And I think it’s okay to call rude people stupid.
And that’s why I like interacting with people I disagree with on substack!


I appreciate the explicit acknowledgment of human psychology in your writing, and I agree that too many Christians over simplify and vilify disagreement as the consequence of sin.
There is something somewhat comforting to me that Jesus acknowledged P and seemed to temper E accordingly in his teaching:
Matthew 11:21-24
“Woe to you, Chorazin! Woe to you, Bethsaida! For if the mighty works done in you had been done in Tyre and Sidon, they would have repented long ago in sackcloth and ashes. But I tell you, it will be more bearable on the day of judgment for Tyre and Sidon than for you. And you, Capernaum, will you be exalted to heaven? You will be brought down to Hades. For if the mighty works done in you had been done in Sodom, it would have remained until this day. But I tell you that it will be more tolerable on the day of judgment for the land of Sodom than for you.”
This statement leaves many questions still unanswered theologically, but I appreciate that Jesus was at least sensitive to the realities of human belief formation.
I would actually start with evolutionary biology.
Why do I have a bad back, fallen arches and stuffed sinuses?
If you're a dual-omni Xn who says original sin, I tell you that that's the problem of psychological evil, especially if from there you double down on Job via Romans and god's inscrutability. Ditto for Orthodox type Jews and Muslims.
If you're a Hindu or Buddhist and say "karma," I then ask is your god or gods subject to karma too that they can't do better evolutionary-based creation. This one applies to monotheist types of evolutionary theists, too.
In both cases, it moves from the individual to the species level. And, to tie back to Hume, it gets straight at the argument from design.
And, if you acknowledge all of the above and accept it, and still worship "something" out there, why? I'll then pivot to Arthur C. Clarke's "magic" comment.