You Wouldn’t Believe Awesome Evidence

And You Shouldn’t Either

Should you believe in God or a religion if presented with “awesome evidence?” That’s a big question on the philosophy of religion side of substack and YouTube. These arguments from awesome evidence (AAE) go something like this:

Would you believe in God if the stars in the sky realigned to say “Jesus is Lord?” What if we discovered data interwoven within the fabric of the universe, that, when decoded, was an unambiguously religious message?

In this post, I’m going to argue that there are so many problems and false assumptions within AAEs that nontheists can safely reject them. In a future post, I’ll talk about Humean reasons to reject AAEs.¹

Should One Datapoint Overturn Your Worldview?

One of the implicit assumptions about the AAE is that one data point could be sufficiently strong to overturn an entire worldview, already informed by multiple data points. The problem with this is that it’s not how rational actors evaluate evidence.

To illustrate this point, let’s postulate a world in which the evidence for theism was lower than the world we live in now. Let’s say that we lived in a world where everyone agreed there was no fine tuning for life, no objective moral values, where the best physics pointed in the direction of an eternal universe, the ontological argument had not been formulated, that the best physics somehow established the necessity of the universe, and that there was no Christianity in this universe (say the events of Christianity happened, and even that Jesus was an established historical figure, but like many ancient religions, died out millennia ago).

If the stars rearranged in the sky to say “Jesus is Lord and God is real,” that would certainly be evidence of some sort for God and Jesus as Lord, but I don’t think rational actors would be justified in believing in the Christian God. This piece of evidence would be the only evidence in support of God as real and Jesus as Lord that inhabitants of that universe would have, while they would also have more evidence against God as real and Jesus as Lord.

All of this illustrates that one datapoint rarely, if ever, overturns a worldview. Rational actors form their beliefs based on cumulative cases of multiple data points. When we’re presented with outlier datapoints that don’t support the “line of best fit” of our theories, we look to explain these outliers with reasoning that assumes the general theory. Put another way, we informally explain how the world functions in terms of rules, and when we find exceptions to those rules, we don’t throw the rules out, but look to explain the exceptions.²

In this way, there’s confusion among both nontheists and theists/Christians about the nature of evidence as it relates to religious or metaphysical beliefs. Namely, both have a misunderstanding of how to interpret strong individual contravening datapoints within a general framework.

When a nontheist says that they only need one piece of good evidence to believe in God, they’re being unintentionally dishonest. In reality, the nontheist will evaluate supposed good theistic evidence through the lens of the cumulative case against God/theism. And so, when rare, purportedly “awesome,” evidence emerges that contradicts their worldview, they won’t overturn their understanding of “the rules” of reality, but look to explain apparent exceptions using the reasoning within that framework.

And before it comes off that I’m being too hard on the nontheist, I think this is true of theists and Christians as well! Their reasoning process is exactly the same: If awesome evidence emerges against their worldview, they don’t overturn their faith. For example, I don’t know of a Christian who agrees with the nontheists on all the arguments against God except one and still claims theism.

How People Actually Form (And Change) Beliefs

All to say, when the Christian advances the AAE or the nontheist says they “just want one piece of good evidence,” they share the implicit assumption that one strong datapoint could overturn their worldview. That assumption is false.

There are many explanations for why this assumption is false, but I’m not going to go too deep into all of them. My preferred explanation is that the human need for multiple paths of explanation is probably an evolutionary adaptation. If all it took to change our mind over something important was one singular datapoint, we couldn’t form consistent belief, we would be easily deceived and exploited, we wouldn’t be able to infer patterns from complex information, and thus we would have a harder time surviving, passing on our genes, or thriving.

And so, a better framework to understand how people form opinions and change their minds is through the lens of cumulative cases and personality types. That is, people form opinions and beliefs through their life experience, which includes but isn’t limited to their personality types, and the expectations, inferences, and positions that they already hold. To alter their beliefs and opinions, you have to present a cumulative case in a manner that’s compatible with that life experience and prior understanding.

Now, for some readers that may appear as mundane Bayesian reasoning, but the important thing to understand is that there is no objective means of formulating the Bayesian equation. Before we can come up with a Bayesian equation to calculate the conditional probabilities, we have to make all of these subjective judgments about the nature of evidence, causality, etc. All of this is grounded in our subjective experience, culture, language, understanding of logic and science, etc. Though the Bayesian equation itself may be mathematically objective, everything else is not.

Digression: Don’t Be Rude!

As a sidenote, this is why I try my best to be nice to people who disagree with me on philosophical and religious issues online, provided they are nice and polite to me. It’s kind of silly to think one can change the opinion of someone on an issue that they’re so committed to or that they have built a blog or a career on.

One single interaction, or even a continuous discussion about a specific argument is not going to change someone’s mind on an issue of such personal importance. If it did, that would be irrational. And so, it’s very silly to me that some people try to force debates with strangers, or cast judgments on their intelligence, or are just in general rude. You’re not educating people or demonstrating superior intellect. Rather, you’re being a jerk and showing you don’t really understand how people reason.

It’s Never Just About The Evidence

The source of disagreements between people on fundamental issues, religious or otherwise, is not one side being more informed, intelligent, virtuous, or rational, but the variation of their life circumstances creating variation in their expectations, inferences, positions, and personality types. This variation makes individual people less receptive to ideas and explanations that don’t already fit within their framework, especially when the subject matter is beyond verification or falsification.

Yes, some arguments are superior to others, but the force of those arguments is subjective and dependent on the psychology of whomever is contemplating the argument.

To name one example, I’m a nontheist who doesn’t care too much about the problem of evil. That seems embarrassing to admit because most philosophers, theist and nontheist alike, agree the problem of evil is the most compelling challenge to theism. To be clear, I think the problem of evil successfully defeats theism, it’s just not the main reason I’m a nontheist. I suspect that’s the case because I’m not confronted with the scale and intensity of suffering in the world. Even though I intellectually know suffering is there, it doesn’t really influence my opinion on the truth of theism or Christianity because it’s just not at the top of my mind.

So, if I ever change my opinion on Christianity or theism, or if the problem of suffering becomes more salient to me, it’s not going to be because I’ve heard a single new theodicy or am exposed to a new argument. Rather, it’ll be because my underlying personality changed or someone presented me with multiple new arguments, compatible with my current personality and my worldview that increased my credence in theism.³

All to say, if you’re going to change someone’s mind about the truth or falsehood of theism, a single datapoint, no matter how compelling, is not going to do the job. Instead, you need multiple pieces of evidence and arguments that are compatible with their underlying personality and identity. If all you provide is a single datapoint, even if it’s extremely compelling, you’re more likely to see that person explain it away, making it compatible with their prior framework.

Again, this is a rational human process to maintain cognitive consistency and protect oneself from deception and exploitation. Humans don’t form beliefs in a void, but in the context of their experience. To the extent that “awesome” evidence exists, it can only exist so far as it is compatible with a prior framework.

Problems With The AAE

The AAE Begs The Question

Let me just repeat what I just wrote, because I think it’s very important:

Humans don’t form beliefs in a void, but in the context of their experience. To the extent that “awesome” evidence exists, it can only exist so far as it is compatible with a prior framework.

I wanted to reiterate this point to transition to my many problems with AAE. Primarily, AAEs beg the question. In an effort to indict the nontheist of dogmatism or irrationality for not changing beliefs based on awesome evidence, it presupposes what awesome evidence looks like.

Specifically, the AAE presupposes that humans observing improbable natural data resembling a religious message for unknown reasons is itself awesome evidence.

I put emphasis on “humans observing improbable natural data” and “for unknown reasons” because nontheists are more likely to doubt initial observations of improbable data and to deny explanations that lack explanation supported by evidence.

Put more directly:

Awesome evidence for a skeptic or nontheist is evidence that is

1. Affirmed by multiple datapoints (or auxiliary evidence)

2. And establishes a clear causal explanation for an event or pattern in the universe.

AAE thought experiments do not meet those conditions, and so from the skeptic and nontheistic perspective, they are not actually awesome evidence.

AAE And Abusing Hypotheticals

Once you recognize how AAE begs the question by presupposing what awesome evidence looks like, other problems become more apparent.

As a nontheist and skeptic, I’m sensitive to when I feel language in a philosophical discussion is doing too much work, glossing over important questions of plausibility. For example, one AAE proposes the stars in the sky rearrange to say something like “I am God and Jesus is Lord.” My follow up question is “what exactly does that look like?”

Some other questions that pop into my brain:

• Are we talking about every star in the sky?

• Is the writing as “clear” as many constellations supposedly look like certain shapes?

• Is this a permanent change? Or something that happens only once?

• Will our best astronomers be able to publish studies on the various gravitational and interstellar impacts of this event?

• Will the stars return to their original position eventually?

• Is this something that just appears in our sky, or will our satellite telescopes see it as well?

These questions may seem like pedantic nitpicking to avoid answering the metaphysical questions, but I don’t think so. That’s because metaphysical or physical impossibility should be important constraints when evaluating counterfactuals and thought experiments.

Let’s say you’re a big supporter of the politician George Monroe, while I am an opponent. I think your support is irrational and bad, so I ask you “Would you be a supporter of Monroe if he murdered 10 people in cold blood?”

If you say you wouldn’t support him, that’s not a big indictment of your current position on account of Monroe hasn’t actually murdered anyone! At the same time, it would be a perfectly valid response for the Monroe supporter to say that the hypothetical is an irrelevant question. After all, the many reasons they support Monroe are probably tangible to the fact that they find the idea of him murdering 10 people in cold blood implausible.

And so, it’s very odd to propose hypotheticals that your interlocutors think are impossible, and use their response as an intellectual failing. There’s no real cost for a nontheist to either reject the hypothetical or admit that they would change their opinion when presented with compelling evidence. But they don’t have to concede that the aforementioned AAE is compelling evidence, because as we’ve seen, the AAE begs the question in ways that the nontheist would disagree.

What if the stars rearranged themselves to say God was real? Would you believe in God then? I don’t know man, that seems like an impossible scenario. The details would be important and I don’t think we could capture them in a hypothetical that seems more to be a word game.

What About Awesome Evidence Against A Religion?

I understand that the formulation of the AAE is supposed to fit neatly into a Bayesian or hypothesis-testing framework, to illustrate the irrationality of non-theists who refuse to accept a prima facie/intuitively more plausible hypothesis. Regardless, I don’t think the hypothetical demonstrates anyone is being irrational, because we can come up with alternative scenarios using the same kind of data that test theists in similar ways. Those theists would be similarly noncompliant as nontheists to the argument, but I don’t think we would say those people are being irrational or dogmatic.

Let’s say the stars realigned themselves to say “Christianity is False” or “The Church of Rome is the One True Church” or “Protestants Are Correct.”

In any of these hypothetical situations, you have the same kind of evidence as a theistic AAE, with the difference being that they would challenge a specific religious sect. I don’t believe the challenged sect would abandon their faith, but instead see the event as demonic.

And so, theists presented either with awesome evidence against their position or with aforementioned AAE scenarios would, like nontheists, not be convinced. They would do any or all of one of the following:

1. Denying the hypothetical is possible,

2. Affirming they’d hypothetically change their position if the evidence was good enough,

3. Or postulating plausible explanations from within their worldview that accounts for the evidence.

As I’ve already explained before, I don’t see anything wrong with this. I think this is rational behavior! Though theists may find nontheistic explanations (like extremely powerful aliens) ad hoc or weird, I don’t see how such explanations are weirder or more ad hoc than demons. Sure, religious ontology may explicitly make space for malevolent beings capable of great works, but nontheistic ontologies don’t preclude the possibility of malevolent-yet-powerful beings. I don’t see why one hypothesis is more acceptable than the other.

The AAE Is An Unfair Dunk

My last criticism of AAE is that it’s an unfair dunk. They’re a gotcha argument against nontheists, trying to expose them as unreasonable and dogmatic.

Beyond all of the substantive reasons I’ve criticized the AAE, it misses something important about the philosophy of religion. Namely, much of the field of philosophy is about coming up with unintuitive answers to questions that appear intuitive on first glance.

A nontheist saying he would not be convinced of God’s existence based on an AAE scenario does not reveal him as irrational or dogmatic, but invites us to listen to his reasoning in the first place!

Put another way, the subtext of AAE arguments are that the nontheist is “coping” when, as far as I can tell, the nontheist is just doing philosophy.

At the same time, a nontheist has good grounds to believe that theists are “coping” themselves!

Specifically, I think many people who are presented with compelling expectation-violating or hypothesis-falsifying evidence against theism or Christianity (problem of evil, religious abuse, problem of teaching factually false things, etc.) merely leave theism and Christianity. For many non-believers and apostates, these evidences are themselves awesome. And so, those who see these arguments and remain within the religion are the dogmatic ones.⁴

But this is a very silly and rude way of looking at people who disagree with you or who assess evidence differently from you. Indeed, I think one of the purposes of philosophy of religion is to understand how different viewpoints come up with intuitive and counter-intuitive explanations. Nontheists have counter-intuitive positions to theists, and vice versa. Being stunned that someone else denies something obvious to you says more about your own deficits of wisdom than theirs.

And so, I think this is an unfair dunk on nontheists. It’s rightfully considered rude for a nontheist to assume theistic interlocutors are dogmatic and irrational merely because they come to radically different conclusions based on the same set of facts. Yet at the same time, the whole point of AAEs seems to be to imply that nontheists are dogmatic and irrational.

So not only is the AAE a bad argument, but it’s also a double standard in decorum that dumbs down conversation. For that reason, I think theists should refrain from using it. If they disagree, that’s fine: I’ll return with the mirrored of this tactic from the atheist perspective, which is just affirming the problem of evil or hiddenness and respond to all responses with an incredulous stare.

1. I was originally going to include that in this post, but it was too long.

2. I just realized this was a Humean framing. Totally unintentional, I promise!

3. The former is more likely than the latter, because I’ve monitored the philosophy of religion discourse for decades and I don’t see any new species of arguments coming around.

4. To be clear, I don’t believe this.