Here’s what I find odd: essentially the naturalist’s ’story’ is that by mere happenstance the universe is intelligible and their are creatures (us) who can fairly reliably interpret that data (with effort). I guess this is the contingency argument, but it just seems to the continual success of the scientific project is evidence for theism. The fact that things are held by some underlying principles suggests something is holding things together. It could be some impersonal underlying force but it just seems odd.
I think this does get to the whole thing of science describes what and how, but it does not provide the why (this is over simplified). Some naturalists tend to say that we just have to “accept there are bare facts,” but honestly this feels just as much of a cop out to retain a worldview as theists saying “it’s mysterious.” I also find it oddly unscientific. Theism in this regard motivates scientific reasoning better (I’d imagine) because there’s always room to wonder more, but the naturalist may say we’ve just hit the wall of explanation.
Maybe my point is that naturalism is metaphysically weak or something. Anyways, I would love to hear what any of this makes you think.
1) I don’t think we can say for certain whether “things are held by some underlying principles.” Rather there are patterns in the world that we observe and that we can quantify observing. This comes back to a fundamental difference between theists and atheists (or more specifically Humeans) view laws of nature. The former conceptualizes them as things that are being imposed upon nature, bringing order to it (presupposing an agent that acts), while the latter just sees them as emergent patterns.
2) I don’t see any evidence that a “why” statement is something needed in the universe. All of the “why” arguments that aren’t confused with “how” arguments seem transparency human-imposed.
3) One of the limitations of our psychology is that it emerged in a context that we can understand and I think there’s just a natural incomprehensibility at a certain scale/outside of that domain. Dawkins had a word for it, but I can’t remember.
4) I don’t think theism motivates scientific reasoning better on account of most Abrahamic cultures (Christianity/Islam) are hostile to scientific inquiry (I wrote about this in one of my latest blogs). I see where you’re going there, but measurably it’s just not true. Atheist scientists as far as I can tell acknowledge that reality is mysterious and that we may not be able to fully understand it or find a satisfactory answer, but they’re motivated to find the answers that we can discern. Put another way, I don’t know of any atheist scientist who ends the day, pats themselves on the back and says “alright, we’ve hit the wall of explanation.”
This is in contrast with theists who typically say “we already have the answers and people who undermine those answers are from satan.” I’m being a little tongue in cheek here, and obviously we can’t overgeneralize but I think we have enough polling data to feel confident that’s the prevailing ethos of either.
1. So I think my point is that if we assume that the natural laws like gravity are just patterns, it’s unexpected on naturalism that there would be any such patterns and that those patterns would persist. Whereas on theism, we would expect patterns and for the patterns to persist. Moreover, if we assume naturalism, we may not call improbable oddities miracles but we should technically not think them to be unexpected. I understand that the wise man therefore should assume that because things have always happened they’ll continue to always happen, but there seems to be a tension there.
2. Given some of what I just said, I think that’s why (lol) these natural descriptions demand a why.
3. Are you talking about the evolutionary mismatch at different scales of analysis? For example, it makes sense to think there something in the bush when it shakes because it’s better for survival to assume a predator, but it is not applicable to fine-tuning.
4. Yeah I mean I was being a bit tongue in cheek as well, but I think my point at the very least is that it is pragmatic to think the world continually demands explanation, and a transcendent God provides reasons for further and further discovery. Of course, people can use it as a cop out too.
1) I don’t know how we can say that such patterns would be unexpected. I feel like that is just a claim theists say to shore up their rhetoric. Meanwhile, it’s the atheist position that we literally cannot make any sense of reality (regardless of theism’s truth or falsity) without presupposing a degree of discernaility. What’s more, I think improbable oddities are expected, relative to how much a system has been observed.
2) I feel like asking for a why is just setting yourself for disappointment (which is why I don’t bother!)
3) Yes. Long story short, “purpose” thinking makes sense for the function of our psychology but it may not be generalizeable to more fundamental questions about reality. I don’t think we can ever know and I think cosmic origin stories are always going to be unsatisfactory (theist or atheist)
4) I think all of the patterns and explanations of the world are interesting in their own right. In this way, I don’t think we need reasons for further discovery beyond our curiosity, which is perhaps endless by virtue of our evolutionary history (we’re explorer!).
> “In a weird way, many theists agree with this formulation of rejection of miracles. They believe the world is decipherable, it’s just that God’s supernatural imposition is a decipherable component of the laws of the universe. God creating a miracle is itself not miraculous, because God suspending the laws of nature is one of the laws of nature.”
I’m a theist who rejects the notion that God suspends the laws of nature. Miracles, in this view, would be wholly explicable in naturalistic terms.
This wouldn’t rule out them being the actions of God, or them being extraordinary and unusual.
Many naturalistic occurrences are extraordinary and unusual.
Here’s what I find odd: essentially the naturalist’s ’story’ is that by mere happenstance the universe is intelligible and their are creatures (us) who can fairly reliably interpret that data (with effort). I guess this is the contingency argument, but it just seems to the continual success of the scientific project is evidence for theism. The fact that things are held by some underlying principles suggests something is holding things together. It could be some impersonal underlying force but it just seems odd.
I think this does get to the whole thing of science describes what and how, but it does not provide the why (this is over simplified). Some naturalists tend to say that we just have to “accept there are bare facts,” but honestly this feels just as much of a cop out to retain a worldview as theists saying “it’s mysterious.” I also find it oddly unscientific. Theism in this regard motivates scientific reasoning better (I’d imagine) because there’s always room to wonder more, but the naturalist may say we’ve just hit the wall of explanation.
Maybe my point is that naturalism is metaphysically weak or something. Anyways, I would love to hear what any of this makes you think.
A few thoughts:
1) I don’t think we can say for certain whether “things are held by some underlying principles.” Rather there are patterns in the world that we observe and that we can quantify observing. This comes back to a fundamental difference between theists and atheists (or more specifically Humeans) view laws of nature. The former conceptualizes them as things that are being imposed upon nature, bringing order to it (presupposing an agent that acts), while the latter just sees them as emergent patterns.
2) I don’t see any evidence that a “why” statement is something needed in the universe. All of the “why” arguments that aren’t confused with “how” arguments seem transparency human-imposed.
3) One of the limitations of our psychology is that it emerged in a context that we can understand and I think there’s just a natural incomprehensibility at a certain scale/outside of that domain. Dawkins had a word for it, but I can’t remember.
4) I don’t think theism motivates scientific reasoning better on account of most Abrahamic cultures (Christianity/Islam) are hostile to scientific inquiry (I wrote about this in one of my latest blogs). I see where you’re going there, but measurably it’s just not true. Atheist scientists as far as I can tell acknowledge that reality is mysterious and that we may not be able to fully understand it or find a satisfactory answer, but they’re motivated to find the answers that we can discern. Put another way, I don’t know of any atheist scientist who ends the day, pats themselves on the back and says “alright, we’ve hit the wall of explanation.”
This is in contrast with theists who typically say “we already have the answers and people who undermine those answers are from satan.” I’m being a little tongue in cheek here, and obviously we can’t overgeneralize but I think we have enough polling data to feel confident that’s the prevailing ethos of either.
1. So I think my point is that if we assume that the natural laws like gravity are just patterns, it’s unexpected on naturalism that there would be any such patterns and that those patterns would persist. Whereas on theism, we would expect patterns and for the patterns to persist. Moreover, if we assume naturalism, we may not call improbable oddities miracles but we should technically not think them to be unexpected. I understand that the wise man therefore should assume that because things have always happened they’ll continue to always happen, but there seems to be a tension there.
2. Given some of what I just said, I think that’s why (lol) these natural descriptions demand a why.
3. Are you talking about the evolutionary mismatch at different scales of analysis? For example, it makes sense to think there something in the bush when it shakes because it’s better for survival to assume a predator, but it is not applicable to fine-tuning.
4. Yeah I mean I was being a bit tongue in cheek as well, but I think my point at the very least is that it is pragmatic to think the world continually demands explanation, and a transcendent God provides reasons for further and further discovery. Of course, people can use it as a cop out too.
What’re your thoughts?
1) I don’t know how we can say that such patterns would be unexpected. I feel like that is just a claim theists say to shore up their rhetoric. Meanwhile, it’s the atheist position that we literally cannot make any sense of reality (regardless of theism’s truth or falsity) without presupposing a degree of discernaility. What’s more, I think improbable oddities are expected, relative to how much a system has been observed.
2) I feel like asking for a why is just setting yourself for disappointment (which is why I don’t bother!)
3) Yes. Long story short, “purpose” thinking makes sense for the function of our psychology but it may not be generalizeable to more fundamental questions about reality. I don’t think we can ever know and I think cosmic origin stories are always going to be unsatisfactory (theist or atheist)
4) I think all of the patterns and explanations of the world are interesting in their own right. In this way, I don’t think we need reasons for further discovery beyond our curiosity, which is perhaps endless by virtue of our evolutionary history (we’re explorer!).
That all makes sense. Thanks for giving your thoughts.
No problem! thanks for your thoughts as well!
> “In a weird way, many theists agree with this formulation of rejection of miracles. They believe the world is decipherable, it’s just that God’s supernatural imposition is a decipherable component of the laws of the universe. God creating a miracle is itself not miraculous, because God suspending the laws of nature is one of the laws of nature.”
I’m a theist who rejects the notion that God suspends the laws of nature. Miracles, in this view, would be wholly explicable in naturalistic terms.
This wouldn’t rule out them being the actions of God, or them being extraordinary and unusual.
Many naturalistic occurrences are extraordinary and unusual.