You say: “Hume is a skeptic in that he likely agreed with many radical skeptical conclusions, that we can’t be completely certain about many foundational truths. But Hume also thought that it was unfeasible to live one’s life this way.”
I’m assuming you are not a pragmatist and seeing as pragmatism wasn’t really around yet Hume probably was not either. Anyways, I just thought this was an interesting tid bit because as far as I can tell Hume is pretty pragmatic.
Moving on…
What’s now very odd to me about this whole chapter is that up to this point in Miracles, Lewis has been concerned primarily with showing that miracles are possible. So, you’d imagine once he gets to the chapter on Hume and Probability this chapter would unfold more like “given miracles are possible are they probable,” but then, as you say, Lewis basically says (incorrectly) that Hume is saying they are not possible. Here’s why this is real head scratcher for me: if you’ve already said miracles are possible, and you think Hume is just saying they are impossible, then you don’t even need to comment on Hume at all. You’ve already done that work.
Tell me if I’m missing something because I’ve been reading quite quickly to get through all the Lewis stuff so I might’ve missed something. But if I’m right, it just seems to me Lewis was totally out of his depth. Or he at least originally thought Hume was making a probabilistic argument, but then after engaging Hume (however much he did) he misunderstood him but thought it still good to have this chapter since Hume is the big bad skeptic.
No you got it right (my brain is just a little fried now). Lewis’s misreading of Hume is arguably the most mainstream reading of Hume because it’s the one most Christians believe (which IMO there are more Christians than non-believers) and as a result people just generally misread Hume (which is why I wrote that)
Now I have read this post, and I’m glad I have. I actually read Of Miracles in undergrad and tried to rebut it. My professor kindly critiqued my response. He said, “that was a good effort but you may need to go back and read it again.” With that said, I did not, like Lewis, claim that Hume was arguing circularly.
I’ve grown a bit more admiration for Hume over time. He’s a fun critic, and (rightly or wrongly) he actually has made my credence for Christianity in some respects go up.
I’m planning on reading Miracles by Lewis soon and then Hume’s Dialogues and Of Miracles later, so hopefully I’ll have more to say (at a much later date). For now, I think it’s right to say that people come to believe in miracles after they have already made other philosophical commitments (metaphysical, ontological, and (maybe) epistemological). Finally, I do wonder if Pascal’s wager (for better or worse) should compel one to look at some miracle claims.
I think when reading Hume, we have to realize his project is (likely) just to destroy the bridge between natural theology and revealed theology.
Specifically, one may find the design of the universe compelling, that there should be a first cause to the universe, or that suspension of the laws of nature could happen, somehow. But Hume just wants to say that we can't bridge the gap between that and revealed religion without presupposing that religion. (That's what most Hume scholars think of his dialogue)
My own position is basically that. I also am not sure if that is any different than what someone like Aquinas is saying, either. I guess Aquinas thought you could prove God, but he didn't think you could prove the Christian God. So, it seems to me that there is some gap between reason and religious claims, which one must bridge by faith. I take that to be basically what Aquinas meant by faith is supra-rational or beyond rational (I can't remember how he put it). If I'm not mistaken, Locke's treatment of that divide is similar.
I guess Aquinas's and other theologians' dismay when their readers wrongly assume reason can prove matters of faith, when reason is merely a preamble, so Hume seems to be a good corrector for people who get too confident in reason. Okay, I'm done rambling now.
Hey Joe, just wanted to say I appreciate your work. I just wrote an essay and invoked David Hume. I was ready to dunk on the is-ought problem as trivial, but you’ve converted me into a Hume enjoyer. Thanks a bunch, you rock.
I saw the tag and read it! Thank you for the shout out! I think Hume may possibly agree that it's logically trivial, however so many people disagree even on that point, so it's not a trivial point lol
Yeah I think that's interesting. My instinct when I first heard the problem was to think that of course humans aren't fully rational. My reading of it now is that he was basically just making that point.
Nice work.
I’m back because I just read the Lewis chapter.
You say: “Hume is a skeptic in that he likely agreed with many radical skeptical conclusions, that we can’t be completely certain about many foundational truths. But Hume also thought that it was unfeasible to live one’s life this way.”
I’m assuming you are not a pragmatist and seeing as pragmatism wasn’t really around yet Hume probably was not either. Anyways, I just thought this was an interesting tid bit because as far as I can tell Hume is pretty pragmatic.
Moving on…
What’s now very odd to me about this whole chapter is that up to this point in Miracles, Lewis has been concerned primarily with showing that miracles are possible. So, you’d imagine once he gets to the chapter on Hume and Probability this chapter would unfold more like “given miracles are possible are they probable,” but then, as you say, Lewis basically says (incorrectly) that Hume is saying they are not possible. Here’s why this is real head scratcher for me: if you’ve already said miracles are possible, and you think Hume is just saying they are impossible, then you don’t even need to comment on Hume at all. You’ve already done that work.
Tell me if I’m missing something because I’ve been reading quite quickly to get through all the Lewis stuff so I might’ve missed something. But if I’m right, it just seems to me Lewis was totally out of his depth. Or he at least originally thought Hume was making a probabilistic argument, but then after engaging Hume (however much he did) he misunderstood him but thought it still good to have this chapter since Hume is the big bad skeptic.
I think you’re right here 100%. Sorry this a short comment in response, I just think you nailed it lol
No worries. It just struck me as so odd I wanted to make sure I didn’t miss something.
No you got it right (my brain is just a little fried now). Lewis’s misreading of Hume is arguably the most mainstream reading of Hume because it’s the one most Christians believe (which IMO there are more Christians than non-believers) and as a result people just generally misread Hume (which is why I wrote that)
Now I have read this post, and I’m glad I have. I actually read Of Miracles in undergrad and tried to rebut it. My professor kindly critiqued my response. He said, “that was a good effort but you may need to go back and read it again.” With that said, I did not, like Lewis, claim that Hume was arguing circularly.
I’ve grown a bit more admiration for Hume over time. He’s a fun critic, and (rightly or wrongly) he actually has made my credence for Christianity in some respects go up.
I’m planning on reading Miracles by Lewis soon and then Hume’s Dialogues and Of Miracles later, so hopefully I’ll have more to say (at a much later date). For now, I think it’s right to say that people come to believe in miracles after they have already made other philosophical commitments (metaphysical, ontological, and (maybe) epistemological). Finally, I do wonder if Pascal’s wager (for better or worse) should compel one to look at some miracle claims.
I think when reading Hume, we have to realize his project is (likely) just to destroy the bridge between natural theology and revealed theology.
Specifically, one may find the design of the universe compelling, that there should be a first cause to the universe, or that suspension of the laws of nature could happen, somehow. But Hume just wants to say that we can't bridge the gap between that and revealed religion without presupposing that religion. (That's what most Hume scholars think of his dialogue)
My own position is basically that. I also am not sure if that is any different than what someone like Aquinas is saying, either. I guess Aquinas thought you could prove God, but he didn't think you could prove the Christian God. So, it seems to me that there is some gap between reason and religious claims, which one must bridge by faith. I take that to be basically what Aquinas meant by faith is supra-rational or beyond rational (I can't remember how he put it). If I'm not mistaken, Locke's treatment of that divide is similar.
I guess Aquinas's and other theologians' dismay when their readers wrongly assume reason can prove matters of faith, when reason is merely a preamble, so Hume seems to be a good corrector for people who get too confident in reason. Okay, I'm done rambling now.
Hey Joe, just wanted to say I appreciate your work. I just wrote an essay and invoked David Hume. I was ready to dunk on the is-ought problem as trivial, but you’ve converted me into a Hume enjoyer. Thanks a bunch, you rock.
I saw the tag and read it! Thank you for the shout out! I think Hume may possibly agree that it's logically trivial, however so many people disagree even on that point, so it's not a trivial point lol
Yeah I think that's interesting. My instinct when I first heard the problem was to think that of course humans aren't fully rational. My reading of it now is that he was basically just making that point.
AI! You’re AI!