Now I have read this post, and I’m glad I have. I actually read Of Miracles in undergrad and tried to rebut it. My professor kindly critiqued my response. He said, “that was a good effort but you may need to go back and read it again.” With that said, I did not, like Lewis, claim that Hume was arguing circularly.
I’ve grown a bit more admiration for Hume over time. He’s a fun critic, and (rightly or wrongly) he actually has made my credence for Christianity in some respects go up.
I’m planning on reading Miracles by Lewis soon and then Hume’s Dialogues and Of Miracles later, so hopefully I’ll have more to say (at a much later date). For now, I think it’s right to say that people come to believe in miracles after they have already made other philosophical commitments (metaphysical, ontological, and (maybe) epistemological). Finally, I do wonder if Pascal’s wager (for better or worse) should compel one to look at some miracle claims.
I think when reading Hume, we have to realize his project is (likely) just to destroy the bridge between natural theology and revealed theology.
Specifically, one may find the design of the universe compelling, that there should be a first cause to the universe, or that suspension of the laws of nature could happen, somehow. But Hume just wants to say that we can't bridge the gap between that and revealed religion without presupposing that religion. (That's what most Hume scholars think of his dialogue)
My own position is basically that. I also am not sure if that is any different than what someone like Aquinas is saying, either. I guess Aquinas thought you could prove God, but he didn't think you could prove the Christian God. So, it seems to me that there is some gap between reason and religious claims, which one must bridge by faith. I take that to be basically what Aquinas meant by faith is supra-rational or beyond rational (I can't remember how he put it). If I'm not mistaken, Locke's treatment of that divide is similar.
I guess Aquinas's and other theologians' dismay when their readers wrongly assume reason can prove matters of faith, when reason is merely a preamble, so Hume seems to be a good corrector for people who get too confident in reason. Okay, I'm done rambling now.
Hey Joe, just wanted to say I appreciate your work. I just wrote an essay and invoked David Hume. I was ready to dunk on the is-ought problem as trivial, but you’ve converted me into a Hume enjoyer. Thanks a bunch, you rock.
I saw the tag and read it! Thank you for the shout out! I think Hume may possibly agree that it's logically trivial, however so many people disagree even on that point, so it's not a trivial point lol
Yeah I think that's interesting. My instinct when I first heard the problem was to think that of course humans aren't fully rational. My reading of it now is that he was basically just making that point.
Now I have read this post, and I’m glad I have. I actually read Of Miracles in undergrad and tried to rebut it. My professor kindly critiqued my response. He said, “that was a good effort but you may need to go back and read it again.” With that said, I did not, like Lewis, claim that Hume was arguing circularly.
I’ve grown a bit more admiration for Hume over time. He’s a fun critic, and (rightly or wrongly) he actually has made my credence for Christianity in some respects go up.
I’m planning on reading Miracles by Lewis soon and then Hume’s Dialogues and Of Miracles later, so hopefully I’ll have more to say (at a much later date). For now, I think it’s right to say that people come to believe in miracles after they have already made other philosophical commitments (metaphysical, ontological, and (maybe) epistemological). Finally, I do wonder if Pascal’s wager (for better or worse) should compel one to look at some miracle claims.
I think when reading Hume, we have to realize his project is (likely) just to destroy the bridge between natural theology and revealed theology.
Specifically, one may find the design of the universe compelling, that there should be a first cause to the universe, or that suspension of the laws of nature could happen, somehow. But Hume just wants to say that we can't bridge the gap between that and revealed religion without presupposing that religion. (That's what most Hume scholars think of his dialogue)
My own position is basically that. I also am not sure if that is any different than what someone like Aquinas is saying, either. I guess Aquinas thought you could prove God, but he didn't think you could prove the Christian God. So, it seems to me that there is some gap between reason and religious claims, which one must bridge by faith. I take that to be basically what Aquinas meant by faith is supra-rational or beyond rational (I can't remember how he put it). If I'm not mistaken, Locke's treatment of that divide is similar.
I guess Aquinas's and other theologians' dismay when their readers wrongly assume reason can prove matters of faith, when reason is merely a preamble, so Hume seems to be a good corrector for people who get too confident in reason. Okay, I'm done rambling now.
Hey Joe, just wanted to say I appreciate your work. I just wrote an essay and invoked David Hume. I was ready to dunk on the is-ought problem as trivial, but you’ve converted me into a Hume enjoyer. Thanks a bunch, you rock.
I saw the tag and read it! Thank you for the shout out! I think Hume may possibly agree that it's logically trivial, however so many people disagree even on that point, so it's not a trivial point lol
Yeah I think that's interesting. My instinct when I first heard the problem was to think that of course humans aren't fully rational. My reading of it now is that he was basically just making that point.
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